Abstract
This assessment examines the impact and performance of USAID's urban and industrial pollution prevention programs based on case studies of the Philippines (PN-ACP-611), Chile (PN- ACG-619), the Czech Republic (PN-ACG-626), India (PN-ACG-629), and Russia (PN-ACM-154). The programs stress, variously, industrial, urban, air, and water pollution. Some focus on preventing pollution at its source, others on end-of-pipe treatments. Some use financial benefits as the main incentive for industries to adopt clean technologies, while others focus on industries' desire to avoid penalties and financial costs. Interventions were generally in one or more of five areas: economic policy reform, government regulations and standards, institution building, education and awareness, and technological change. The impact of these interventions was mixed. The Philippines, Chile, and India studies all reported positive financial benefits. This was not the case, however, in the Czech Republic and Russia, where USAID-funded activities focused more on urban than on industrial pollution. Although the environmental impact was positive in all five countries, the availability and reliability of emissions and effluent data needed to reach this conclusion varied among countries. Data were far more thorough and credible in the Philippines and the Czech Republic than they were in Chile, India, and Russia. Unfortunately, health surveillance data, needed to measure changes in human morbidity and mortality in response to changes in environmental quality, were not collected in any of the five countries. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the health impact of the projects was positive. Each of the five programs was at least partially effective. This was certainly the case in Chile, the Philippines, and the Czech Republic (at the national level). By contrast, most components of the programs in Russia, India, and the Czech Republic (at the municipal level) were generally less effective. Program benefits were sustained after USAID funding ended in Chile, the Czech Republic (at the national level), and Russia (under the Moscow Water Quality project). This was generally not the case in the Philippines, the Czech Republic (at the municipal level), Russia (under the Air Management project), or India (except for the Financial Institutions Reform and Expansion [FIRE] project). Finally, except for FIRE-D (the FIRE project's debt component), benefits were not replicated beyond the original target areas, participants, or industries in any of the countries. Six key lessons were learned: (1) Companies will not invest in pollution prevention or control technologies or environmental management systems unless they perceive it to be in their business interest. (2) Environmental regulations and their strict enforcement are important in motivating companies to acquire pollution control technologies. (3) A pilot effort is an excellent way to demonstrate the benefits of pollution prevention methods, but it should include a plan to ensure that benefits are sustained after donor funding ends. (4) An industrial pollution prevention program cannot hope to reach all firms directly, but needs an intermediary to spread the message. Careful targeting with an eye to sharing and spreading successful results can also encourage replication. (5) Lack of financing is typically not a serious constraint for large firms that want to procure pollution control and prevention technology. However, it often hinders individual small and medium-size firms. For municipalities, domestic environmental funds or bonds can be important sources of financing for environmental infrastructure. (6) "Before" and "after" data are needed to monitor program performance and assess program impact. Program sustainability within a company and replication beyond it depend on the availability of reliable data and information. (Author abstract, modified)