Abstract
Final evaluation of the USAID program in response to the 8/7/98 terrorist bombing outside the U.S. Embassy in Kenya (8/02-8/02). The USAID/Kenya bombing response program has been composed of a comprehensive array of projects, including the immediate and follow-up medical care of the many Kenyans injured, trauma counseling for survivors, payments of school fees for the children of victims, aid to those disabled by the explosion, reconstruction and replacement of the more seriously damaged buildings, assistance to businesses hurt by the bomb blast and specific measures, such as blood safety programs, emergency medical training and disaster planning, to better prepare Kenya for future disasters. Over 4 years, USAID has provided Kenya $42.3 million for these activities. USAID, especially its resident bilateral Mission, worked with a variety of U.S. and Kenyan contractors, NGOs, and other partners to implement the many, diverse components of the program. This USAID assistance probably affected some 50,000 Kenyan victims, survivors and their families in helping to rebuild their lives and to overcome the serious economic impact of this disaster. USAID overall did an excellent job in managing this program. After a slow and difficult start, mostly due to funding problems in Washington and less than satisfactory performance by a few organizations in Nairobi, USAID/Kenya worked through a complex set of project, legal, managerial, compassionate and other concerns to design and implement activities that responded well to meet the legitimate needs of the Kenyan people affected by this disaster. The staff from USAID's various offices in Kenya pulled together well as a team to implement an effective program to share with Kenyans the burdens of the effects of this terrorist attack. The overwhelming majority of Kenyans interviewed individually and in focus groups were genuinely appreciative of this U.S. government (USG) assistance. Despite some of the serious problems encountered, the evaluators applaud the efforts and successes of USAID in implementing this program and believe that Kenyans are emerging reasonably well from their suffering and are now better able today to handle future disasters based on lessons learned in this tragedy. Major recommendations and lessons learned are as follows: (1) Because this 1998 terrorist bombing and the traumatic events of September 11, 2001 have sadly introduced a new era, USAID needs to review urgently its management procedures about how best to respond to this type of disaster when it strikes again and to manage the ensuing recovery efforts. The experience in Kenya would be a very good case study to stimulate this discussion and to help update USAID and some other USG procedures. (2) At the top of the list, there must be a change in the systemic problems that impede the provision of adequate funding expeditiously to Missions. An expansion of OFDA's mandate or some other "bridge" funding mechanism between the immediate disaster relief and the later recovery efforts needs to be arranged faster. (3) USAID/Kenya would have benefitted from more flexible delegations of authorities and temporary staff from Washington, particularly early on, to design projects faster and avoid delays and extensions. (4) Because of the uniqueness of the bombing response program, the Mission should seriously consider establishing a qualified Bombing Response Unit (BRU) to carry out similar activities in the future without unduly hampering other Mission responsibilities. (5) In implementing programs of this type, USAID Missions should still look to partner with U.S. and local contractors and other organizations as much as possible, while careful to ensure the management capabilities of these entities and their sub-partners to carry out the specific tasks required. (6) It is important to involve and work with local government organizations to the extent of their capacities and interest in particular activities, although this seems to have been difficult in this Kenya case. (7) NGOs often rise to the occasion, having the right set of skills, motivation and funding, and are usually a valuable resource in such disasters and recovery efforts. (8) When implementing partners collaborate and share information, they are much stronger and effective both individually and as a whole. (9) USAID learned well a lesson from the Oklahoma City bombing that early and continuing mental health counseling is important in such traumatic situations. (10) In the spirit of "public diplomacy", USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi should continue to provide appropriate information and publicity about the many positive results of this program in order to stifle lingering local criticism based on a lack of knowledge about what has actually been accomplished by the USG. (11) Because there is some residual funding available from this program and there are still worthy needs, USAID/Kenya should extend selected activities for one more year, like the payment of school fees, follow-up medical care and medications, and improved facilities at the Nairobi morgue, to complete priority elements in this bombing response program. (12) Other activities, like the blood safety project and counseling, should be continued under the Mission's bilateral health program especially as related to HIV/AIDS prevention, and the disaster preparedness assistance should be continued under the aegis of OFDA, especially working with the Kenyan National Disaster Operations Center and providing more training in emergency health care.