Abstract
Final evaluation of the Office of Transition Initiatives' (OTI) program (7/99-8/02) to promote peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone, with emphasis on the Diamond Management Program (DMP) and the Youth Reintegration and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP). The main objectives the DMP were to bring diamonds (and other valuable minerals) under Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) control in order to enhance revenues from legal trade, and to cut the trade in conflict diamonds used to finance warfare. OTI made progress in achieving both objectives. Specifically, OTI: (1) made a unique contribution by working with and positively influencing the GOSL; (2) increased the participation of civil society; (3) actively participated in the ongoing effort to establish the Kimberly Process, designed to certify and verify exported diamonds and limit the importation of smuggled diamonds; (4) helped establish a Certificate of Origin procedure for Sierra Leone; (5) assisted the ongoing attempt to establish a clean channel, minimize corruption, and help the GOSL improve the speed and reliability of the legal process; (6) trained mines monitoring officers; and (7) helped establish the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), an innovative, community-based approach to controlling the illicit diamond trade. The best indicator of DMP success is an increase in the value of legally exported diamonds; the short-term (1999-2001) trend is clearly positive. The concept, general design, and some of the methodology of the DMP especially the DACDF model -- may be replicable elsewhere. The YRTEP, an impressive and innovative approach to addressing the critical role of youth in Sierra Leone's conflict, seemed to have had a positive impact on the peace process. It proved successful in a variety of ways and achieved most of its original objectives (reintegration, the strengthening of peace-building initiatives, and public support for demobilization). Success was only qualified, however, with trade-offs and concerns that must be addressed if YRTEP is to reach its full potential. Major findings on YRTEP are noted below. (1) By mixing ex-combatants and war-affected youth in the same program, YRTEP assisted the reconciliation and reintegration process and diminished potential conflicts that arise when services are provided only to ex-combatants. The curriculum was stimulating (covering self, healing mind, body, and spirit, the environment, health and well-being, and democracy, good governance, and conflict management), but also directive, with few opportunities for participatory interaction, and low literacy gains. It was also very resource-intensive, making production and distribution difficult. The major design weakness is inattention to closure; repeatedly, participants reported a sense of frustration over how the training ended, and they feel only partially prepared to implement lessons learned. The quick start-up was impressive, and several observers believed that the rapid response helped secure peace. Repeatedly, it was stated that YRTEP got youth off the street and engaged them in something that was meaningful and beneficial for the community. The push to implement during the early, uncertain post-war transition resulted in a lack of time to field-test materials or approaches. Several early "cracks" in the program were never overcome. Security requirements frequently made it difficult or impossible for expatriate staff to visit program sites. Only recently have staff members been allowed to travel freely. The most impressive finding is the degree to which participants and community members report improvements in youth behavior. Participants vividly and consistently demonstrate great enthusiasm when describing experiences and the changes in their lives. YRTEP provides a solid foundation for initiating additional community development programs. The message is positive, and participants see it as an impetus to create positive change. Where there was sufficient participation by women, there was an increase in women's sense of empowerment. Community ownership remains partial, however; most communities still refer to YRTEP as a World Vision activity. Finally, YRTEP inspired an impressive degree of community activism (though there is little evidence that other agencies are taking advantage of this potential) and established a network of trainers and community-level organizations that offer important resources for future USAID programs. YRTEP can and should be replicated, provided the lessons learned from the evaluation are drawn upon. Its theme of inclusion -- targeting thousands of ex-combatant as well as marginalized, out-of-school youth -- makes YRTEP a potentially critical contributor to other peace-building efforts. YRTEP successfully reached tens of thousands of youths, energizing the transition from war to peace by involving out-of-school and ex-combatant youth in productive activities, and reaching them in remarkably short order. Overall, OTI is to be commended for its performance in Sierra Leone. Problems in program design and implementation were minor in comparison with the overall effectiveness of an innovative, risk-taking, and very successful country program that had a major impact.