Abstract
Final external evaluation of a project (5/90-5/96) to strengthen Swazi private and public sector managerial/administrative capabilities as well as the training institutions that support private sector growth (STRIDE project). The project contributed much to Swaziland's human resource and institutional development. It began as a traditional training activity, but was modified to respond to changes in the Swaziland environment. In fact, the deteriorating Swazi economy and the political changes in southern Africa were seized by STRIDE as opportunities to promote new, more democratic relationships among the Government of Swaziland (GOS), the private sector, and labor. In all, there were 217 U.S. long-term trainees, 276 external short-term trainees, and 4,063 in-country trainees. The third- and in-country training target groups and numbers had been revised radically, following the mid-term evaluation (XD-ABJ-965-A). For example, given the failure of the project's original plans to train traditional community leaders and the emergence of more democratic forms in Swaziland, leadership training was shifted to address the needs of newly elected political leaders and to reinforce the trend toward participatory democracy. Additionally, 3rd-country and in-country training were linked in an effort to involve all of the social partners -- government, employers, and labor -- in a sustained dialogue to facilitate political and economic change. A sampling of those attending STRIDE Phase II training events and an analysis of the records in USAID and STRIDE offices indicate that this strategy has been successful. When efforts of California Polytechnic University (CalPoly) to strengthen the Swaziland College of Technology (SCOT) and the University of Swaziland (UNISWA) were not as successful as envisioned (for reasons detailed in the 5/93 special evaluation, (PD-ABL-219), USAID/S identified alternative local institutions which could be dealt with directly rather than through a cooperative agreement. These activities seem to be making some inroads. For example, training provided to BMEP/Lulote, a local organization devoted to small and micro business development, has greatly strengthened both management and training capabilities. Also, through its participation in STRIDE, the local training institution SIMPA has formed a linkage with Technikon SA, which will provide SIMPA a continuing source of technical support and backstopping, particularly in public sector management training and urban governance. Numerous lessons were learned. (1) During Phase II, STRIDE shifted its focus from individuals and institutions, and aimed directly at inducing sectoral impacts (improving the education and training system) and national impacts (improving industrial relations) by offering activities to whole communities of interested stakeholders. Conferences and workshops were used to mobilize and engage large numbers of people from diverse interest groups. Secondly, every training event was seen as requiring follow-up activities, such as creating working groups or special workshops on specialized topics, as well as follow-up meetings in which the original participants would reconvene for reflection and review. STRIDE purposely opened the door to broad participation, facilitated the development of networks across interest groups, and gave people an opportunity to set clearer vision and goals for sectoral and national change. (2) The performance of the STRIDE Steering Committee could serve as a model for other training projects. Such a committee is critical to project success and is only effective if it is comprised of individuals who possess authority to represent their sectors and organizations, respect for differences of opinion, and a shared vision of how to use training to promote significant organizational, sectoral, or national change and not merely to impart skills and knowledge to individuals. The committee must be transparent in its decision making and have clear standards and procedures for scrutinizing and approving applications for training, especially the long-term training on which career advancement often depends. (3) The contractor's record of no drop-outs and an average record return rate of trainees completing academic courses within 80% of the time usually scheduled was the result of a number of practices, e.g., carefully matching participants and training institutions, installing a toll-free 800 number for participants to call, regularly checking on participants' academic progress, etc. Similarly, the efforts of Swazi public and private institutions to nominate trainees in needed skill areas and to award them post-training promotions according to performance seem to be major incentives in establishing a 100% return rate of trainees to the institutions from which they departed. (4) Because Democratic Governance (DG) initiatives cannot be terminated abruptly, bilateral DG projects must ensure that their most important components are continued in regional projects; such a phase-over, however, cannot be managed solely from a regional office, but requires extensive oversight within the country.